Constitutional Law -- Contempt by Publication by McCoy, Donald W.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 26 | Number 2 Article 6
2-1-1948
Constitutional Law -- Contempt by Publication
Donald W. McCoy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald W. McCoy, Constitutional Law -- Contempt by Publication, 26 N.C. L. Rev. 183 (1948).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol26/iss2/6
1948] NOTES AND COMMENTS 183
Constitutional Law-Contempt by Publication
Petitioners, a publisher, an editorial writer, and a news reporter pub-
lished a serie3 of news articles which were not an accurate report of
the facts of a case or of the issue before the judge. An editorial called
the judge's refusal to hear both sides of the case "high-handed," a
"travesty on justice," said that public opinion was "outraged," and
deplored the fact that the judge was a "layman" and not a competent
attorney. The trial judge concluded that the reports and editorial were
designed falsely to represent the nature of the proceedings and to
prejudice and influence the court in its ruling on a pending motion for
a new trial. The petitioners were adjudged guilty of contempt and
sentenced to jail for three days. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied.1 On.certiorari held, three judges dissenting, reversed. The
articles and the editorial did not constitute a clear and present danger
to the administration of justice.2
The history of summary proceedings for contempt by publication in
this country presents an interesting conflict betwen the right of freedom
of speech and of the press, and the right to fair and orderly administra-
tion of justice.3
Courts early assumed the power to punish summarily for constructive
contempts.4 Legislatures fearing that the power. was open to serious
misuse sought to define it by statute.5 The judiciary proved reluctant
and soon again reasserted its power.6 After the famous impeachment
trial of Judge Peck in 1831, 7 the federal courts' contempt powers were
limited by Congress to those committed in the presence of the court, or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.8  The federal
courts followed what seemed to be the intent of Congress in their con-
struction of this act0 until in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States0
the Supreme Court said that "so near thereto' was not a spatial limita-
tion, and that contempts by publication could be punished if they had
'Ex Parte Craig, 193 S. W. 2d 178 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946).
'Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.)
1141 (1947).
'See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COL.
L. Rev. 401 et seq. (1928).
'Respublica v. Qswald, 1 Dall. 319 (U. S. 1788).
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §5-1 (7); N. Y. JuDiCLAY LAW §750; PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 17 §2044.
* State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855) (power necessary to preserve judiciary);
State v. Tugwell, 19 Wash. 238, 52 Pac. 1056 (1898) (statute declaratory, not
restrictive).
7 See Nelles and King, supra note 3, at 423, for an excellent discussion of
Judge Pecek's impeachment trial.
84 STAT. 487 (1831). 28 U. S. C. §385 (1940).
'Ex parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265 (1883) (disbarring an attorney for riotous
conduct) ; Kirk v. United States, 192 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 9th 1911) (corrupting an
expected juror).
10 247 U. S. 402 (1918).
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a reasonable tendency to obstruct the administration of justice."1 This
rule stood until in Nye v. United States 2 the court gave the statute its
obvious meaning by holding that "near" in this context meant physical
proximity and not relevancy.
In Bridges v. California,13 in a five to four decision, the clear and
present danger test14 was first adopted to contempts by publication, the
court saying that before contempt will lie in publication cases, the sub-
stantive evil that is threatened must be extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high.'5
This was followed by an unanimous decision in Pennekamp v. Flor-
ida 6 in which the application of the test in constructive contempt cases
was reaffirmed. The Supreme Court also made it evident that it would
make no distinction between contempts based on state statutes and con-
tempts at common law.'
7
In the principal case the Texas court in denying the writ of habeas
corpus recognized that the clear and present danger test governed1 8 but
sought to distinguish the Bridges case on the fact that there labor con-
troversies were involved.'
9
The Supreme Court, while conceding that the nature of the case is
relevant in determining whether the clear and present danger test is satis-
fied, stated that the rule of both the Bridges and Pennekamp cases serves
the needs of any type of litigation. 0
The court has recognized the difficulties inherent in applying the
clear and present danger rule to specific situations in the contempt by
publication field and has expressed the hope that the rule would take
substance through the process of judicial interpretation.2' A case more
extreme than either the Bridges, Pennekamp, or Craig cases must appear
before this can be realized. However, language of Mr. Justice Murphy
11The rule of this case brought sharp criticism. Frankfurter and Landis,
Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts, 37 HARv. L. REV.
1010, 1029 (1924). Nelles and King, supra note 3, at 540.
12313 U. S. 33 (1941).
18314 U. S. 252 (1941).
14The clear and present danger doctrine was first laid down in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), a case involving distribution of leaflets en-
couraging draftees to evade conscription. The rule has been applied to many civil
liberties situations: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937) (conviction under
statute against insurrection), Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) (statutes
against peaceful picketing), Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945) (statute
restricting solicitation of labor union membership).5 Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263 (1941).
21328 U. S. 331 (1946).
"'The Florida court sought to distinguish the Bridges case since California
had no statute providing for contempt by publication. This distinction was not
discussed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Pennekamp case.
IsEx parte Craig, 193 S. W. 2d 178, 188 (Tex. Cr. App. 1946).
19 Ibid.
2 Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1256, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1141, 1147 (1947).
2" Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 334 (1946).
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in the Pennekamp and Craig cases would seem to indicate that the clear
and present danger rule removes from the area of summary contempt
proceedings all comment except that which threatens to create a situation
in which it would become impossible for the courts to carry on their
business.
22
The conclusion that does emerge from these three cases is that the
Supreme Court has determined that the right to freedom of speech and
press requires a nation-wide, uniform policy 23 and that when the free-
dom of comment conflicts with the right to a fair and orderly adminis-
tration of justice, the former will weigh heavily against the latter.24
It is believed that this rejection of the principle of judicial absolutism
is more consonant with our fundamental ideas of the functions of a free
press in a democracy than the views which formerly prevailed on the
power of judges to punish summarily for contempt by publication. 25
DONALD W. McCoy.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Discrimination
Against Negroes in Selection of -Jury
The question of denial of equal protection of the laws by discrimina-
tion against Negroes in selection of juries has recently arisen again in
North Carolina.'
"- "To talk- of a clear and present danger arising out of such criticism is idle
unless the criticism makes it impossible in a very real sense for a court to carry
on the administration of* justice." Mr. Justice Murphy concurring in Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 369 (1946). "The only possible exception is in the
rare instance where the attack might reasonably cause a real impediment to the
administration of justice." Mr. Justice Murphy concurring in Craig v. Harney,
U. S. -, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1258, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1141, 1149 (1947).
CHAFEE FREE SPEECm IN THE UNITED STATES. (1941), p. 6.
Craig v. Harney, - U. S. - , 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L. Ed. (Adv.
Ops.) 1141, 1144 (1947).
"' The court leaves open the question of the power of a state to protect the
administration of justice by means other than summary contempt process.
U. S. - . 67 S. Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L. Ed. (Adv. Ops.) 1141, 1144 (1947).
1 In Spring Term, 1947, there were seven cases involving this question: State
v. Koritz, 227 N. C. 552, 43 S. E. 2d 77 (1947); State v. Brunson, 227 N. C.
558, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ; State v. Jones, 227 N. C. 558, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ;
State v. King, 227 N. C. 559, 43 S. E. 2d 82 (1947) ; State v. Watkins, 227 N. C.
560, 43 S. E. 2d 83 (1947) ; State v. James, 227 N. C. 561, 43 S. E. 2d 83 (1947) ;
State v. Kirksey, 227 N. C. 445, 43 S. E. 2d 613 (1947). The opinion of the
Koritz case was adopted in all of the others cited except State v. Kirksey. There
a Negro was indicted for murder. After exhausting his peremptory challenges,
he challenged the twelfth juror passed by the state peremptorily, in that he was a
white man and jury was composed solely of white persons. Judge heard evidence
and found as fact: that Negroes had been regularly summoned for jury duty in
the county, that Negroes' names had not been excluded from the jury box and
that there was no evidence before the court that discrimination had been practised
because of race or color by the jury commissioners. It was held, on appeal, that
to take advantage of an irregularity in constitution of a whole panel, defendant
must have challenged the array. But that if challenge had .been timely and
appropriately taken, findings of fact by the presiding judge would be conclusive
on appeal in the absence of gross abuse.
19481
